Signaling strategic commitment for organizational transition: how to manage potential M&As through voluntary disclosures by Angwin, Duncan et al.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Signaling strategic commitment for organizational tran-
sition: how to manage potential M&As through volun-
tary disclosures
Conference Item
How to cite:
Angwin, Duncan; Meadows, Maureen; Yakis-Douglas, Basak and Ahn, Kwangwon (2012). Signaling
strategic commitment for organizational transition: how to manage potential M&As through voluntary
disclosures. In: SMS 32nd Annual International Conference: Strategy in Transition, 6-9 October 2012, Prague,
Czech Republic.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© Not known
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://prague.strategicmanagement.net/
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copy-
right owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult
the policies page.
oro.open.ac.uk
1 
 
SIGNALING STRATEGIC COMMITMENT FOR ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSITION:  
HOW TO MANAGE POTENTIAL M&A THROUGH VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 13th 2004, Deutsche Boerse AG (DB), which owned the German stock exchange in 
Frankfurt, announced a 530p per share bid for the London Stock Exchange (LSE) – both 
exchanges are amongst the largest in the world. This valued the LSE at £1.3bn and represented a 
23% premium on the LSE share price two days earlier. DB shareholders were concerned about 
the announcement, believing the deal would be value destroying. The lack of timely and effective 
communication after the announcement, and the seeming indifference of DB management, led to 
dissatisfaction regarding the deal and growing concern about the governance of the company. It 
was not until March 2005 that the Chairman finally attempted to communicate with shareholders 
to allay their concerns about the proposed takeover, but the effort was too little too late. The offer 
for the LSE was withdrawn on 7th March and the CEO of DB was forced to resign, along with the 
Chairman of the Board and other board members. This example illustrates the importance of 
communicating strategic commitment to the markets after the announcement of a proposed 
transaction – the hoped for strategic transition to create Europe’s largest stock exchange failed.  
 
It is well known that ‘involuntary’ (those required by law) announcements of M&A bids move 
stock market prices (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001; Goergen & Renneboog, 2003) and 25% 
increase in target company share price is not uncommon (Baker & Limmack, 2002; Sudarsanam 
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& Mahate, 2003). However, existing M&A research does not comment on market reactions to 
‘voluntary’ designed communications that occur post-announcement. In this phase, deals can be 
made or broken by share price adjustments (as in the opening example) as investors react to deal-
specific information released during the period. For top management teams to win support for 
their M&A strategy external communications directed at analysts and investors, on top of 
financially-orientated events (earnings announcements, more closed meetings), may matter.  
 
This paper contends that ‘voluntary’ designed communications are indications of strategic 
commitment, and their production, dissemination and consumption influence investor sentiment. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are a substantial strategic commitment. In the years 2008 – 
2010, approximately $5.9 trillion were spent on M&A worldwide. Alongside this substantial 
financial investment, considerable managerial and organizational resources were also deployed in 
order to close these deals and integrate the companies. This effort to achieve renewal of the firm 
is a major strategic commitment as M&A is a substantial investment, generally for long-term 
benefit and not easily reversed. However, announcing an intention to purchase a specific firm is 
not the same as closing a deal as many things may go wrong. A vital aspect of the process is to 
persuade investors to back the deal, as negative investor reaction can prevent the transaction from 
being consummated. In order to persuade investors of the wisdom of the M&A, protagonists 
communicate information to the markets. This information will help to inform investor decisions 
about the price of protagonist shares during a bid.  
 
The purpose of this paper therefore is to evaluate whether the communication of strategic 
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commitment affects investors’ sentiment towards the protagonists in a specific M&A. Extending 
Strategy-as-Practice’s interest in communicating strategy within the organization, we examine 
organizational communications outwards to the institutional domain. We intend on shedding light 
on the practices, practitioners, and praxis of communicating strategic commitment to investors. 
To do this, we test whether the practice of signaling strategic commitment through voluntary 
communications during M&A is associated with abnormal returns, and if so, which practitioners 
and praxis are associated with significant outcomes.  
 
Theoretically, our research draws  on the recent Strategy-as-Practice perspective’s concern for 
formal strategy as a phenomenon whose practices, claims, discourse and artefacts need to be 
taken seriously in their own terms, independent of enacted strategies (Whittington, 2006). 
Regarding practitioner-based contributions, it will present concrete, practice-related outcomes 
for senior managers on how to manage their M&A process through external communications. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Strategic Commitment and external communications 
Demonstrating strategic commitment matters. Mainstream strategy literature suggests there are 
significant advantages to strategic commitments (Pacheco-de-Almeida et al, 2008; Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Ghemawat, 1991; Ghemawat and del Sol, 1998). These include decisions that 
have long-term impacts and are difficult to reverse. For instance, future market space may be 
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secured and rivals discouraged from investing (Pacheco-de-Almeida et al, 2008). However, 
strategic commitments are effective only if they are visible, understandable, credible and 
irreversible (Besanko et al, 2004). If the commitment is not visible then those who the 
organization wants to influence will be unaware of the initiative. Similarly if the commitment is 
not understandable its effect will not be optimal. The commitment also has to be credible to 
interest groups and should be irreversible, as an action that is costly to stop once in motion 
demonstrates commitment.  
 
The literature on strategic commitment has focused on the importance of understanding the long-
term consequences of business decision-making, and upon the notion that earlier choices 
constrain later ones (Ghemawat, 1991). An important theme in this literature is the choice that 
companies face between commitment to competing in a particular way, and the flexibility to 
compete effectively in a variety of ways (e.g. Ghemawat and del Sol, 1998). It has been argued 
that “making early irreversible commitments may secure future market space and discourage 
rivals from investing; the inflexibility of such commitment has value by shaping rivals’ future 
behavior. Given these two opposing views, it is often not obvious which of the two drivers - 
flexibility or inflexibility - will ultimately prevail in imperfectly competitive and uncertain 
business situations” (Pacheco-de-Almedia et al, 2008, p.517-8).  Interestingly, research into 
strategic commitment has so far overlooked how investors’ perceive the signaling of strategic 
commitment by subsequent voluntary corporate communications. Having alerted investors to the 
intention to takeover or merge with another company, this powerful set of stakeholders search for 
information to help them decide whether to buy, sell, or hold onto stock of the companies 
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involved. In this process they may look for evidence in corporate communications for signaled 
commitment to the success of the transaction.  
 
Another possible reason for both acquirer and target firms to show commitment towards an M&A 
deal may be related to the method of payment. Previous literature suggests that there are a range 
of factors driving an organisation’s choice of method of payment for an M&A deal; for instance, 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) found that both bidder financial condition and corporate control 
concerns have a clear influence on European M&A financing choices, while Martin’s (1996) 
findings support the notion that the higher the acquirer's growth opportunities, the more likely the 
acquirer is to use stock to finance an acquisition. However, if the acquirer is paying with equity, 
then a higher equity value reduces the number of shares required (and hence the cost of the deal); 
this may be a less important consideration if the acquirer is paying with cash.  There are also 
benefits for the target firm, as a higher equity price means a greater return.  
 
Taking the above issues into consideration, the following sections explore the practices, 
practitioners, and praxis of corporate communications that occur during M&A, to understand 
whether the use of such communications to signal commitment makes a difference in terms of 
share price reaction and if so, which elements make a difference. 
 
Practices: Corporate communications as a signal of strategic commitment 
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While strategic commitment is most effective when backed by concrete action, it can also be 
demonstrated through communicating intention (Besanko et al. 2004), particularly because the 
firm or management stand to lose something, such as reputation, should the promise not work out 
(Besanko et al. 2004). In the context of M&As, the literature provides evidence of the importance 
of corporate communications (e.g. Sirower and Lipin, 2003).  There are a number of possible 
approaches for exploring why this might be the case. The first comes from finance, where 
strategy communications can be considered under the general rubric of 'voluntary disclosures', 
phenomena such as earnings forecasts, business segment reporting and new product 
announcements (Bassen et al, 2010: 63). The second avenue is inspired by signaling theory in the 
strategy literature (Farrell, 1987). The third approach to explaining strategy communications is 
institutionalist, taking account of different and changing sociological contexts (e.g. Rao and 
Sivikumar, 1999).  
 
It is widely accepted that managing third-party perceptions is an important task for both sides in a 
merger; for instance Trautwein (1991) notes that “mergers need marketing just like products, and 
effectively addressing the public or regulatory institutions in a merger may be critical to its 
success’ (p. 293). Management scholars have discussed why some firms engage in more frequent 
and comprehensive disclosure than others. It has been suggested that large size of firms may 
reduce disclosure costs, by spreading the cost of information management and, perhaps, by 
reducing the threat of competitor reaction (Bassen et al, 2010). For complex businesses, 
voluntary disclosures can help mitigate the agency problem existing between corporate 
managements and shareholders: the reduction in uncertainty attendant on reducing information 
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asymmetries increases the willingness of shareholders to pay more for the company's stock 
(Bassen et al, 2010; Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
 
Interestingly, research into strategic commitment has so far overlooked how investors perceive 
the signaling of strategic commitment by subsequent voluntary corporate communications. 
Having alerted investors to the intention to takeover or merge with another company, this 
powerful set of stakeholders search for information to help them decide whether to buy, sell, or 
hold onto stock of the companies involved. In this process they may look for evidence in 
corporate communications for signaled strategic commitment to the success of the transaction.  
 
From a practice perspective, we suggest that managing third-party perceptions is an important 
task for both sides in a merger; “mergers need marketing just like products, and effectively 
addressing the public or regulatory institutions in a merger may be critical to its success’ 
(Trautwein, 1991: 293). We therefore suggest: 
 
Hypothesis 1: External communications during M&A will have a significant 
impact on stock prices, in either a positive or a negative direction 
 
Practitioners: M&A protagonists  
Communications do not stand ‘on their own’, but are weighed up alongside the credibility of the 
protagonists. This credibility, or reputation, is something gained over time, through repeated 
actions, and can mean the difference between a message being accepted at face value or simply 
ignored. At the organizational level, M&A protagonists such as M&A team members or the 
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M&A director may have built up significant experience in M&A over time and the markets may 
have sight of how these deals have performed. If this has been good, there is likely to be a 
positive reputational effect upon subsequent M&A communications. Hence: 
Hypothesis 2: External communications carried out by organizations which have 
M&A specialists will have a significant positive impact on stock prices 
 
The credibility of M&A communication may also be influenced by high-reputation 
intermediaries. These high status firms may include investment banks, lawyers, accountants, 
consultants and other professional advisors. For instance, the use of an advisor with a 
distinguished reputation in transacting M&A may influence the credibility of the M&A 
communication even if the protagonists themselves have little M&A experience. The types of 
advisors available and their status in assisting companies engaged in M&A varies across the 
world as societal institutions pre-structure the M&A ‘game’. This ‘structural power’ (Clegg, 
1989) reflected in ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Whitley, 1999) determines which individual firms and 
actors play and their status. For instance there are differences in the role of actors such as 
shareholders, managers and employees in co-ordinated market economies, such as Germany and 
France, and Anglo-American economies (Morgan, 2007). Even within Anglo-American 
economics there are important structural variations concerning M&A with the role of investment 
banks in the UK dominating the voluntary regulatory institutions which manage the M&A 
process. In the UK, regulation is not imposed from the outside by a detached governmental body 
(as in the US), but rather by “a group that has strong connections to the interests of shareholders” 
(Bebchuk and Ferrell, 1999, p.1192). The different role of advisors in M&A communications has 
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received little research attention to date, and variations in national context for advisors may play 
an important role. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3a External communications involving legal advisors in the magic 
circle will have a significant positive impact on stock prices 
 
Hypothesis 3b External communications involving financial advisors in the bulge 
bracket will have a significant positive impact on stock prices 
 
Hypothesis 3c External communications involving white shoe consultants will 
have a significant positive impact on stock prices 
 
 
Praxis: What they say 
Companies that are transparent and comprehensive in their communication of corporate plans are 
more likely to gather the consensus of the financial community around bold strategic plans 
(Mazzola et al, 2006).  Martens et al (2007) suggest that firms should adopt narratives that 
convey a comprehensible identity, “elaborating the logic behind proposed means of exploiting 
opportunities and embedding entrepreneurial endeavors within broader discourses” (p. 1107). 
Media coverage of acquisitions also illustrates that the same actors can draw on different (even 
contradictory) discourses at different points in time, and that different actors may draw on the 
same discourse to support their opposing objectives (Tienari et al, 2003). 
Hypothesis 4a External communications comprising of qualitative information will 
have no significant impact on stock prices  
 
Hypothesis 4b External communications comprising of quantitative information 
will have a significant impact on stock prices, in either a positive or negative 
direction  
 
Hypothesis 5a External communications that include integration plans will have a 
significant impact on stock prices, in either a positive or negative direction 
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Hypothesis 5b External communications that include plans regarding synergy 
gains will have a significant impact on stock prices, in either a positive or negative 
direction 
 
Hypothesis 5c External communications that include investment information will 
have a significant impact on stock prices, in either a positive or negative direction 
 
 
Hypothesis 5d External communications that include retention information will 
have a significant impact on stock prices, in either a positive or negative direction 
 
In summary, M&A communications may move share prices, but little consideration has been 
given to what elements of corporate communications make a difference to markets. It is argued 
here that firm strategic commitment can be detected in communications and this can positively 
influence investors’ perceptions of M&A. This signaled commitment may be visible in the nature 
of the communications themselves, the volume and timing of communications and their content. 
Communications may also be interpreted more favorably if protagonists have reputation relevant 
to M&A, through prior M&A history for instance. The reputational aspect of communication 
may also be augmented through the use of professional intermediaries who bring their own 
professional status to the deal process. National context may make a difference in terms of the 
value intermediaries may bring to M&A communications and may also affect the nature of 
communications and the perceptions of investors. Nevertheless strategic commitment through 
communications patterns, content and associations may be important in explaining positive or 
negative share price performance between the announcement and completion of M&A and may 
even influence deal outcome. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
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Dataset  
Our dataset comprises of all M&A deals involving target UK and US publicly owned 
organizations within the period 01/01/2000-31/12/2010. We collected data using MergerMarket 
regarding all relevant target and bidder data along with all related external communications 
associated with the deal. Regarding UK targets, there are 12269 deals and 47678 
communications. For the US market, there are 36376 deals, and 163023 external 
communications. We limit our research findings to public organizations that trade in NYSE and 
NASDAQ.  
Dependent variable: Cumulative abnormal returns associated with strategic plan presentations  
The objective of our study is to analyse the stock price responses to interim news events carried 
out during M&A deals. We treat these as events liable to generate cumulative abnormal returns in 
the financial market (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). We test for Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) to interim news events during M&A deals. These news events are not the actual 
announcements of the M&A, nor are they are announcements of the closing of the deal. They are 
external communications associated with the deal throughout the course of the M&A, 
undistinguished between the authors (the bidder or target). Our approach is in line with Mazzola 
et al's (2007) unpublished study of strategy announcements on the Milan stock exchange, in 
which cumulative abnormal returns were averaged together. Mazzola et al (2007) found 
significant impacts on average cumulative abnormal returns only for small companies uncovered 
by analysts, in other words companies with a substantial information deficit. 
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We calculated abnormal returns using a market model for each firm with an estimation window. 
The deviation was calculated using expected returns and actual returns for every firm1. The 
model to capture CAR was: 
   and                                 (1) 
We used the S&P 500 as the index of market portfolio which is a weighted index that indicates 
the price trend movements based on a broad cross-section of the market. To estimate the market 
model, we used the 260 trading day period prior to the event window as the estimation window 
(see MacKinlay, 1997). The length of the period used in our study was consistent with prior 
studies in management literature (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). To calculate CAR, a 3-day 
event window (t= -1 to +1) was used2. The short window is used because long windows may lead 
to false inferences about the significance of an event (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Similar 
studies to ours published recently in the Strategic Management Journal have also used a 3-day 
window (see for example Johnson et al., 2005; Park and Mezias, 2005; Shen and Cannela, 2003; 
Tian et al., 2011; Zhang and Wiersema, 2009). In order to calculate the expected return over the 
t= [-1, +1] event window, we used the coefficient found from regression (1). Inferences about the 
cumulative abnormal returns were drawn using the formula below to test the null hypothesis that 
the abnormal returns are zero: 
                                                          
1
 Source: Datastream 
 
2
 To further validate our findings, we performed a supplementary analysis. We analyzed the data using alternative 
stock effect event windows: a five-day window (-2, +2), a seven-day window (−3;+3), an 11-day window (−5;+5), 
and a 21-day window (−10;+10). The model results become increasingly insignificant with the longer event 
windows. These analyses are available from the authors. 
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      (2) 
For our estimation model, we used a static linear panel data model where CARij is the cumulative 
abnormal return for firm i for event j.  
 
In our regression model, our dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns associated 
with a given communication and our analysis is divided into two main categories: namely 
practitioners and praxis. In terms of practitioners, we coded our variables as binary: If the 
organization under question had an M&A team or an M&A director, we coded these as ‘1’ and 
‘0’ if otherwise. Regarding high-reputation intermediaries, we used binary codes to distinguish 
organizations that employed legal advisors in the magic circle3, financial advisors in the bulge 
bracket4, and white shoe consultants5. 
                                                          
3
 Legal advisors in the magic circle for the UK: Allen & Ovary , Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Linklaters, Slaughter 
and May; For USA: Arnold & Porter; Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft; Cravath,  Swaine & Moore; Covington & 
Burling; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Debevoise & Plimpton; Dewey & LeBoeuf; Hogan & Hartson; Latham & Watkins; 
Milbank, Tweed,  Hadley & McCloy; Ropes & Gray; Shearman & Sterling; Sidley Austin; Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett; 
Sullivan & Cromwell; White & Case; Willkie Farr & Gallagher; WilmerHale. 
4
Financial advisors in the bulge bracket: Dillon, Read & Co.; Swiss Bank Corporation; UBS ; First Boston ; Credit 
Suisse ; Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; Lehman Brothers ; Merrill Lynch ; Bank of America ; Salomon Brothers ; Travelers Group ; 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch; Barclays Capital ; Citigroup ; Deutsche Bank ; Goldman Sachs ; JPMorgan Chase ; 
Morgan Stanley ; Lazard Freres & Co. ;  Goldman, Sachs & Co. ; N M Rothschild & Sons 
 
5
 White shoe consultants: Bain & Company; Boston Consulting Group; McKinsey & Company; A.T. Kearney; Booz & 
Company; Arthur D. Little;  Monitor Group 
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In terms of praxis, we identified communications that presented qualitative (soft information) and 
quantitative (financial) data, and those that included both simultaneously. For each variable in 
hypotheses 5a-5d, we identified relevant words.  For integration, for instance, we searched for the 
words integrat*, put together, add, mix, incorporate, join together, amalgamate, combine, 
assimilate, sell off, harvest, divest. Similarly, we coded for synergy, investment, and retention. In 
addition to forming a variable comprised of communications that involved a commitment for 
integration, we formed two further variables: those that in addition to signaling commitment, also 
included a timetable and those that shared explicit restructuring plans with their investors.  
 
We introduced a variety of control variables for factors that were likely to impact on market 
reactions. All of the control variables are used as proxies for contexts/events associated with a 
vacuum of information that would leave investors hungry for information. To take into account 
changes in the market, we controlled for market volatility. We further controlled for shareprice 
shock as a proxy for a drastic event that may taken place within the past six months regarding the 
organization (i.e. CEO change, product recalls, environmental disasters etc.). To take into 
account any possible effects of the financial crisis, we coded communications after 24 October 
2008 as ‘1’ for ‘after the crisis’. The nature of the deal may also affect the role and impact of 
communications. If the deal is hostile, then the protagonists will both be fighting hard to persuade 
shareholders of the correctness of their strategies as in this instance there will be winners and 
losers. We therefore distinguished between deal types by controlling for recommended and 
hostile deals. We also controlled for acquirers by distinguishing between domestic and overseas 
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bidders. The method of payments may also make a difference as the issuance of debt may be 
regarded as more risky to the business, due to long-term obligations, rather than the use of equity. 
To take this into account, we introduced controls for type of financing (stock or no stock). We 
further took into account the complexity of the deals. Finance theory suggests that market 
reactions are likely to be larger for companies subject to greater information failures, e.g. small 
companies, small deals (Mazzola et al, 2006; Griffin, 2003). The extent to which 
communications affects investors is likely to be affected by the relative size of the protagonists. If 
the M&A is small relative to the acquirer, in turnover terms, then there may be less need for 
protagonists to communicate to the markets as the effect of the deal on the acquirer will be 
limited. To calculate relative size, we used Marketcap, and for the relative size of the deal, we 
took a ratio of deal versus firm size. Finally, we accounted for factors that may act as 
confounding effects for our variables associated with high-reputation intermediaries such as 
whether or not an organization has a reputation for being a serial acquirer and whether the 
organization is listed on the Fortune Global 100 most admired list. The weight placed upon 
communications by the markets may also be affected by the reputations of the protagonists in 
terms of M&A experience. Recent research into serial acquirers suggests that firms with a history 
of M&A tend to perform better than those with little M&A experience (Laamanen and Keil, 
2008). Firms with significant prior M&A experience are more likely to be trusted in terms of 
their announcements than those that are inexperienced. 
 
Before carrying on with the rest of the study, we assessed carefully the issue of potential 
multicolinearity between the variables (Aiken and West, 1991). We inspected the values of 
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variance inflation factors (VIF) to assess our data for multicolinearity. The VIF values ranged 
between 1.12 and 3.39 for the variables in our regression models, which is much lower than the 
commonly accepted threshold value of 10 (Hair et al., 1998) and demonstrates that 
multicolinearity is not a problem in our data.  
 
RESULTS 
Our purpose is two-fold: first to establish whether strategic commitment (signalled through 
external communications during M&As) has any impact on the market; second, to find out 
aspects of strategic commitment markets are more sensitive to. Our analysis therefore proceeds in 
two steps. In step one, we test whether signals of strategic commitment are associated with 
shareprice reaction. In order to test this, we test for Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) to 
interim news events during M&A deals. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of these news events 
throughout the dataset, plotted against the M&A trend.  
Insert Figure 1 
Figure 1, a descriptive figure of the interim news events over time demonstrates several things: 
Communication practices vary greatly over time and across UK and US firms. UK and US 
organizations tend to act in opposition within boom and bust periods (defined here as relatively 
lower global aggregate deal value (in mil $)): UK organizations communicate more when the 
market is down and they communicate less when the market is up. The US firms are exactly the 
opposite: US firms become significantly more communicative in optimistic times and very silent 
during times characterized with pessimism. 
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Insert Figure 2 
In stage two of our analysis, we carry out a regression to identify what aspects are associated with 
share price reaction. Table 1 below includes the correlations and Table 2 includes our regression.  
Insert Table 1 
Insert Table 2 
Our regression comprises of four models and four subsections for each model. We distinguish 
between CAR for UK and USA and then further for target and bidder organizations. In Model 1, 
we test for practitioners; in Model 2, we test for praxis; in Model 3, we add the control variables; 
in Model 4 we bring all the variables together to form the model which has the highest 
explanatory power. In each model, the independent variables are accompanied by relevant control 
variables. Our final model is significant at p<0.005 with Adj R-sq. = 0.33 and a relatively low 
RMSE at 0.14. 
 
Our first set of independent variables involve in-house M&A specialists and high-reputation 
intermediaries and the interaction effects for legal, financial, and consultancy firms. For these 
variables, we found that M&A specialists and financial advisors are associated with significant 
positive responses for both UK and US investors. We did not find any significant outcomes for 
legal advisors or consultants. In terms of the interaction effects, we found significant positive 
results regarding all interaction effects that included financial advisors. Therefore, we conclude 
that we find support only for hypotheses 2 and 3b but not for 3a and 3c.  
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In terms of praxis, regarding the type of information provided (qualitative versus quantitative), 
we found positive significant results (p<0.01) with regards to qualitative data for UK bidder 
organizations, and positive significant results in all four categories regarding quantitative data 
(significance levels varied between 0.05 and 0.005) and qualitative and quantitative data (p-
values varied between p<0.05 and p<0.01). We find that while overall significance levels are 
higher regarding reactions to financial data (mostly due to US investors), overall, there is a 
significant decrease in the standard errors associated with hybrid data compared to pure forms of 
information. We therefore find partial support for hypothesis 4a (for UK bidders only) and 
complete support for 4b. For the rest of the variables in this category, we found positive and 
significant results for communications that include information regarding integration, integration 
timetables, and integration with restructuring plans. All correlation coefficients were positive and 
significance levels varied between p<0.05 and p<0.01 across the two country categories. 
However, these significant results were only associated with bidders, and not target 
organizations. We therefore conclude that we find support for hypotheses 5a only for bidder 
organizations. Regarding more general information that signals strategic commitment, we found 
that investors only react significantly to information regarding synergy and investment, but not to 
retention. Our significant findings are only valid for investors of US bidder organizations. While 
the regression coefficients for UK bidders is close to the figure we see in US bidders (for 
synergy: UK=0.00; US=0.01; for investment: UK=0.02; US=0.06), the regression coefficients for 
UK are not significant because of the high standard errors associated with these coefficients 
compared to that of US (for synergy: UK=0.17 compared to US=0.03; for investment UK=0.21 
compared to US=0.02). We therefore find support for hypotheses 5b but due to high standard 
errors, do not include investment and retention in our final model.  
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Regarding the relevant control variables, we found significant results varying between p<0.1 and 
p<0.01 for market volatility, share price shock, after 2008, and time. Again, the higher 
significance levels were associated with the US market, and US bidders in particular for these 
variables. The control variables we use to accompany these variables are mostly significant as 
well. We found that hostile deals, deals involving organizations in unrelated industries, cross 
border acquisitions, and stock financing attract significant and negative reactions across all four 
categories. On the other hand, deals involving organizations within the related industries, 
domestic acquirers, and complex deals are associated with significant and positive investor 
reactions. From the two control variables that we employ to test along these variables, we found 
positive and highly significant results (p<0.001) for serial acquirers in the UK and US. Whether 
or not organizations were on the FG Most Admired list did not seem to make a difference to the 
investors of either nationality. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This research demonstrates that investors care about strategic commitment. We use voluntary 
external communications as a proxy for testing how investors react to signals of strategic 
commitment.  
We further analyze practitioner aspects associated with M&As that are likely to be associated 
with share price reaction. Regarding communication characteristics, we found that investors are 
in favor of communications drafted with the help of M&A specialists and high-reputation 
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financial intermediaries. The reason why we did not find any share price reaction associated with 
magic circle lawyers or white shoe consultants may be due to the fact that investors already 
expect all organizations to employ lawyers or consultants to go through with M&A deals. The 
positive reaction associated with high-reputation intermediaries, however, is highly associated 
with having a good reputation of being a serial acquirer as well.  
 
Regarding praxis, we found that while investors react positively to information regarding 
integration, they tend to react more favorably towards integration information accompanied by 
more detailed plans such as a timetable regarding when these integration plans will be conceived 
or detailed discussion of restructuring plans. Commitment becomes more convincing when 
presented with detailed plans and a deadline. These reactions, however, are restricted to investors 
of the bidder organizations. This makes sense, as the investors of bidder organizations are more 
likely to be nervous about how the organization will now manage a large investment.  
 
Investors also react very strongly to different types of information, with varying national 
differences: For instance, while investors based in the UK are sensitive towards qualitative 
information, US investors favor financial data. When presented with both types of data, however, 
both parties show a significant decrease in standard error, signaling greater certainty with which 
investors assess information.  
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Furthermore, regarding the content of communications, we found that information regarding 
synergy and investments tend to be associated with positive reactions from investors, but not 
other types of information such as retention. These reactions tend to be restricted to US investors. 
While it seems that investors in the UK market react just as strongly, they are uncertain about 
their reaction whereas the investors in the US market are far more confident. One important point 
to raise here is that the reactions investors give to what they hear in communications is not 
independent from various other factors surrounding the deal. For instance, investors have very 
strong considerations regarding whether the deal is a hostile takeover, the industry that the newly 
acquired business belongs to, the nationality of the acquirer, type of financing, and complexity of 
the deal. 
 
It also seems that investors have become more susceptible to communications not only over time, 
but even more so after the financial crisis. Our findings were consistent across the UK and US 
markets. When we compare the outcomes between bidders and targets, however, we find that 
investors react more strongly (but nonetheless in the same direction) towards communications 
carried out by targets. 
 
More generally, stronger reactions were associated with the US market in particular, and with 
investors of bidder organizations. This may be due to several reasons: organizations operating in 
the US market may have a more established practice of external communications, and therefore 
are more likely to have mastered the skill of communicating to their investors. Alternatively, the 
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investors of US markets may simply be more savvy, paying more attention to the M&A process 
more so than UK investors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Incumbents trying to defend their position in an industry can signal commitment in order to deter 
new entry, for example by announcing ambitions with regard to market share or future capacity 
increments or by affirming the importance of that industry with regard to the strategy of the firm 
as a whole (Porter, 1985). In industries where there are large sunk costs (because of R&D or 
initial capital investments), there are incentives to signal commitment clearly to competitors in 
order to discourage new entrants (Farrell, 1987). Similarly, in capital intensive industries such as 
paper and pulp, announcements of plans for new capacity help to manage aggregate investment in 
the industry, holding back more marginal projects, especially in competitive sub-sectors 
(Christensen and Caves, 1997). Signaling strategic commitment can thus work to reduce 
competitive rivalry in an industry, and is particularly likely where large investments are required. 
On the other hand, there are insights from the institutionalist literature on why firms might 
choose to signal commitment. Thus the institutional context in which at least American large 
firms have evolved in the last decade has seen a growing emphasis on shareholder value as the 
guiding norm of business, associated with the rise of large institutional shareholders such as 
mutual funds and an accompanying increase in the numbers of financial analysts hungry for 
information (Fligstein, 2001; Davis, 2009). In this institutional environment, there are substantial 
penalties to corporations that are unable to 'sell' strategic visions that fit the preconceptions of the 
analyst and shareholder community, the discount suffered by conglomerates being a case in point 
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(Zuckerman, 2000). The result has been a parallel rise within large corporations of investor 
relations professionals, responsible for supplying information to shareholders and analysts (Kelly 
et al, 2010; Sandhu, 2009). Taking an institutionalist perspective, Rao and Sivikumar (1999) find 
that the creation of investor relations departments by Fortune 500 firms is significantly associated 
with the number of financial analysis following the company, as well as the existence of board 
interlocks with other companies that had already instituted investor relations departments. Similar 
institutional factors may be at play in the decision to signal strategic commitment.  
 
Our research has several practice-related outcomes: First. the results of our regression analysis 
(Table 3) demonstrate that managers can accrue great benefits by signaling strategic commitment 
through voluntary communications during M&A. Significant abnormal returns associated with 
these communications show that investors place great emphasis on strategic commitment. 
Furthermore, by communicating, managers can ensure that their investors can act in unison, with 
small margins of deviation between their reactions.  
 
Second, organizations engaging in M&A should be extra cautious about what they say now (as 
opposed to the past) because investors seem to have become more perceptive towards 
communications over time, especially after the financial crisis. This may be due to increasing 
hypercompetition, coined with increasing anxiety about financial survival of organizations. While 
our findings show that investors of both UK and US markets act alike (in terms of which aspects 
they react to, and the direction of reactions), investors of bidder firms react more strongly 
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towards communications compared to those of target firms. This means that managers of bidder 
firms should pay extra attention to their voluntary communications.  
 
Third, managers should accompany their promises with solid, detailed plans on how to 
materialize these promises. Our results show that while investors react positively to information 
regarding integration and synergy, they tend to react more favorably towards integration 
information accompanied by time tables or restructuring plans. These reactions, however, are 
restricted to investors of the bidder organizations. Again, managers of bidder organizations are 
advised to be more careful in terms of how they construct their communications. 
 
Another important point for managers of organizations based in UK and the US is to keep in 
mind that while investors based in the UK are sensitive towards qualitative information, US 
investors favor financial data.  
 
Fourth, investors care a great deal about whether organizations employ high-reputation financial 
intermediaries, but are indifferent towards organizations’ choices regarding magic circle lawyers 
or white shoe consultants. This may be due to financial intermediaries charging a success fee – a 
sign of commitment, unlike their counterparts. The positive reaction associated with high-
reputation intermediaries, is also highly associated with having a reputation of being a serial 
acquirer as well which means that investors are keen followers of organizations’ M&A history, 
and evaluate previous acquisitions as a signal for future success. 
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Finally, managers of US bidder companies will have to tread more carefully when constructing 
communications because their investors react far more strongly to what they hear. Overall, 
stronger reactions were associated with the US market in particular, and with investors of bidder 
organizations. This may be due to several reasons: organizations operating in the US market may 
have a more established practice of external communications, and therefore are more likely to 
have mastered the skill of communicating to their investors. Alternatively, the investors of US 
markets may simply be more ‘savvy’, paying more attention to the M&A process than UK 
investors. And finally, reactions associated with communications may be due to differences in 
analyst following.  
 
In terms of future research, our article reveals that interim news events offer a fertile new source 
of data on how to manage M&A. This paper has suggested that these communications are not 
empty talk, but can have substantive effects, as measured by cumulative abnormal returns. The 
issue for the future should be not whether or not companies communicate during M&A, but what 
makes makes their communication better or worse. 
 
In sum, this paper has offered one way of taking a new approach to strategic commitment 
research. It has identified a new source of data on M&As in the form of voluntary 
communications. These communications are in the public domain and easily captured. We have 
also applied an event methodology that discriminates between bidders, targets, and takes national 
differences into account. Contrary to the sceptical finance and accounting literature on cheap and 
soft talk, these communications do seem to matter. We suggest that investors care a great deal 
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about strategic commitment. This finding is not geographically restricted but valid for both UK 
and US investors. We offer various suggestions regarding the practice, practitioners, and praxis 
regarding voluntary communications during M&A.  
 
Our research has its limitations: First of all, our dataset only involves two markets and excludes 
Asian and South American markets. Second, the number of observations in two datasets are quite 
different in size. Finally, despite having cross-checked a sample of data among two sources, we 
collected data using only one source. 
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Figure 1. UK and USA interim news events plotted against global M&A trend  
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Figure 2. Cumulative abnormal returns associated with interim news events 
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Table 1. Correlations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Variables Mean 
St. 
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 M&A specialists 0.63 0.48 1.00            
2 Legal advisors in the magic circle 0.96 0.18 -0.05 1.00           
3 Financial advisors in the bulge bracket 0.98 0.15 0.00 -0.06 1.00          
4 Consultants – white shoe 0.94 0.23 0.01 -0.02 0.02 1.00         
5 Qualitative data 0.43 0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.42 -0.01 1.00        
6 Quantitative (financial) data 0.57 0.20 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00       
7 Integration  0.21 0.41 -0.01 0.06 -0.89 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 1.00      
8 Integration (timetable) 0.14 0.35 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00     
9 Integration (restructuring plans) 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 1.00    
10 Synergy 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 1.00   
11 Investment 0.05 0.23 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 1.00  
12 Retention 0.09 0.29 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.04 1.00 
13 Market volatility 0.43 0.42 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.03 
14 Share price shock 0.21 0.41 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
15 After 2008 0.14 0.20 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
16 Time (continuous) NA NA -0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.20 
17 Recommended deal 0.19 0.39 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 
18 Contested, Hostile deal 0.14 0.35 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.22 0.04 
19 Related 0.63 0.34 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 
20 Unrelated 0.37 0.44 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01 
21 Domestic acquirer 0.66 0.41 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.09 
22 Cross border acquirer 0.22 0.19 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
23 Stock 0.11 0.10 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.54 
24 No stock 0.43 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.04 
25 Simple 0.12 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
26 Complex 0.45 0.16 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01 
27 Relative size of bidder vs. target (small to large) NA NA 0.13 -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 
28 Relative size of bidder vs. deal (same as above) NA NA -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
29 Serial M&A 0.18 0.66 0.49 0.47 0.59 0.01 0.82 0.94 0.63 0.81 0.72 0.00 0.73 0.60 
30 On FG 100 most admired list 0.22 0.11 0.28 0.65 0.55 0.64 0.75 0.92 0.40 0.73 0.93 0.53 0.10 0.46 
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Table 1 continued 
 
  Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
13 Market volatility 1.00                  
14 Share price shock -0.07 1.00                 
15 After 2008 0.73 -0.05 1.00                
16 Time (continuous) 0.04 -0.01 0.06 1.00               
17 Recommended deal -0.97 0.07 -0.77 -0.04 1.00              
18 Contested, Hostile deal -0.03 -0.22 -0.02 0.00 0.03 1.00             
19 Related -0.04 -0.51 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.12 1.00            
20 Unrelated -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.42 1.00           
21 Domestic acquirer -0.10 0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 0.81 0.51 1.00          
22 Cross border acquirer -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.09 1.00         
23 Stock -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.00 1.00        
24 No stock -0.01 -0.21 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.16 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.09 1.00       
25 Simple -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.01 1.00      
26 Complex 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00     
27 Relative size of bidder vs. target (small to large) -0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.09 0.05 0.52 -0.08 0.65 -0.01 0.17 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 1.00    
28 Relative size of bidder vs. deal (same as above) 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 1.00   
29 Serial M&A 0.04 0.48 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.78 0.67 0.38 0.33 0.92 0.78 0.59 0.89 0.85 0.73 0.82 1.00  
30 On FG 100 most admired list 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.69 0.97 0.89 0.53 0.88 0.69 0.44 0.85 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.90 1.00 
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Table 1 continued 
 
  p-values 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 M&A specialists NA             
2 Legal advisors in the magic circle 0.03 NA            
3 Financial advisors in the bulge bracket 0.00 0.24 NA           
4 Consultants – white shoe 0.35 0.88 0.74 NA          
5 Qualitative data 0.65 0.38 0.48 0.00 NA         
6 Quantitative (financial) data 0.56 0.81 0.66 0.00 0.37 NA        
7 Integration  0.12 0.83 0.88 0.00 0.77 0.86 NA       
8 Integration (timetable) 0.18 0.52 0.47 0.00 0.14 0.38 0.77 NA      
9 Integration (restructuring plans) 0.65 0.59 0.69 0.00 0.41 0.62 0.87 0.42 NA     
10 Synergy 0.06 0.41 0.90 0.15 0.65 0.20 0.47 0.06 0.08 NA    
11 Investment 0.98 0.88 0.63 0.31 0.94 0.55 0.84 0.33 0.59 0.81 NA   
12 Retention 0.54 0.65 0.80 0.38 0.61 0.76 0.92 0.61 0.78 0.28 0.73 NA  
13 Market volatility 0.11 0.59 0.58 0.67 0.83 0.49 0.82 0.08 0.53 0.66 0.54 0.03 NA 
14 Share price shock 0.00 0.99 0.97 0.45 0.96 0.21 0.09 0.85 0.92 0.00 0.03 0.70 0.12 
15 After 2008 0.57 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.24 0.70 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.64 0.36 0.97 
16 Time (continuous) 0.01 0.70 0.41 0.42 0.85 0.94 0.00 0.47 0.68 0.06 0.11 0.30 0.01 
17 Recommended deal 0.00 0.98 0.53 0.27 0.66 0.44 0.80 0.21 0.42 0.59 0.40 0.06 0.92 
18 Contested, Hostile deal 0.00 0.95 0.99 0.39 0.85 0.22 0.09 0.89 0.90 0.00 0.02 0.68 0.13 
19 Related 0.55 0.01 0.79 0.34 0.58 0.74 0.91 0.59 0.76 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.67 
20 Unrelated 0.03 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.06 0.42 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.60 1.00 
21 Domestic acquirer 0.00 0.80 0.68 0.01 1.00 0.11 0.60 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.14 
22 Cross border acquirer 0.02 0.17 0.09 1.00 0.18 0.14 0.49 0.71 0.93 0.00 0.02 0.88 0.80 
23 Stock 0.25 0.06 0.82 0.42 0.64 0.78 0.93 0.65 0.80 0.32 0.76 0.87 0.72 
24 No stock 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.82 0.42 0.68 0.89 0.49 0.70 0.80 0.64 0.81 0.59 
25 Simple 0.03 0.53 0.21 0.72 0.80 0.43 0.82 0.46 0.53 0.49 0.44 0.69 0.01 
26 Complex 0.94 0.36 0.76 0.30 0.30 0.71 0.90 0.28 0.73 0.49 0.68 0.83 0.10 
27 Relative size of bidder vs. target (small to large) 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.92 0.55 0.72 0.91 0.23 0.75 0.66 0.69 0.84 0.65 
28 Relative size of bidder vs. deal (same as above) 0.25 0.07 0.36 0.37 0.10 0.86 0.71 0.96 0.99 0.02 0.21 0.52 0.41 
29 Serial M&A 0.30 0.02 0.62 0.02 0.98 0.54 0.84 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.73 0.44 
30 On FG 100 most admired list 0.28 0.89 0.92 0.72 0.83 0.90 0.97 0.84 0.91 0.66 0.89 0.94 0.87 
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Table 1 continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  p-values 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
14 Share price shock NA                 
15 After 2008 0.15 NA                
16 Time (continuous) 0.00 0.20 NA               
17 Recommended deal 0.46 0.34 0.01 NA              
18 Contested, Hostile deal 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.30 NA             
19 Related 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.63 0.49 NA            
20 Unrelated 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 NA           
21 Domestic acquirer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.32 0.00 NA          
22 Cross border acquirer 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 NA         
23 Stock 0.34 0.54 0.88 0.03 0.33 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA        
24 No stock 0.12 0.36 0.94 0.00 0.34 0.80 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 NA       
25 Simple 0.03 0.00 0.70 0.94 0.04 0.67 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.72 0.17 NA      
26 Complex 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.17 0.62 0.81 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.62 NA     
27 Relative size of bidder vs. target (small to large) 0.61 0.00 0.72 0.61 0.63 0.83 0.00 0.29 0.63 0.85 0.78 0.64 0.80 NA    
28 Relative size of bidder vs. deal (same as above) 0.87 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.56 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.14 0.43 0.50 NA   
29 Serial M&A 0.02 0.61 0.10 0.39 0.02 0.71 0.02 0.24 0.00 0.75 0.64 0.43 0.05 0.69 0.67 NA  
30 On FG 100 most admired list 0.23 0.78 0.65 0.86 0.24 0.94 0.57 0.71 0.63 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.79 0.89 NA 
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TABLE 3: Regression 
 
 Model 1* Model 2** Model 3† Model 4*** 
 UK USA UK USA UK USA UK USA 
 Target Bidder Target Bidder Target Bidder Target Bidder Target Bidder Target Bidder Target Bidder Target Bidder 
Intercept 0.14 (0.94) 
0.44 
(0.52) 
0.05 
(0.27) 
0.54 
(0.65) 
0.34 
(0.62) 
0.23 
(0.23) 
0.73 
(0.56) 
0.25 
(0.23) 
0.34 
(0.23) 
0.37 
(0.72) 
0.81 
(0.25) 
0.23 
(0.92) 
0.23 
(0.73) 
0.34 
(0.26) 
0.78 
(0.63) 
0.37 
(0.23) 
Main effects (hypotheses)                 
      Practitioners                 
M&A specialists 0.01† (0.16) 
0.05** 
(0.13) 
0.03† 
(0.05) 
0.06** 
(0.03)     
0.00 
(0.37) 
0.04** 
(0.17) 
0.01† 
(0.08) 
0.05** 
(0.06) 
0.01† 
(0.16) 
0.05** 
(0.13) 
0.03† 
(0.05) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
High-reputation intermediaries                 
Legal advisors in the magic circle -0.03 (-0.76) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
0.02 
(0.13)     
-0.01 
(-0.78) 
0.00 
(0.21) 
-0.00 
(-0.51) 
0.01 
(0.18)     
Financial advisors in the bulge 
bracket 
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.03*** 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.06 
0.03*** 
(0.09)     
0.00 
(0.28) 
0.02** 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.03** 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.04*** 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.05*** 
(0.08) 
Consultants – white shoe 0.03 (0.76) 
0.04 
(0.51) 
0.08 
(0.32) 
0.05 
(0.54)     
0.02 
(0.78) 
0.03 
(0.61) 
0.06 
(0.41) 
0.04 
(0.60)     
Legal*Financial 0.02 (0.29) 
0.01** 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.02** 
(0.07)     
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.01* 
(0.19) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.01* 
(0.11)     
Legal*Consultants 0.04 (0.43) 
0.05 
(0.28) 
0.11 
(0.46) 
0.12 
(0.33)     
0.02 
(0.51) 
0.04 
(0.33) 
0.09 
(0.49) 
0.10 
(0.38)     
Financial*Consultants 0.01 (0.20) 
0.02** 
(0.12) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.03** 
(0.05)     
0.00 
(0.26) 
0.01* 
(0.20) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.01* 
(0.17)     
Legal*Financial*Consultants    0.00 (0.27) 
0.01** 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.02** 
(0.07)     
   0.00 
(0.45) 
0.01* 
(0.33) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
0.01* 
(0.11)     
Praxis                 
Qualitative data     0.03 (0.41) 
0.05** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.47) 
0.03* 
(0.24) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.04 
(0.41) 
0.05** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
Quantitative (financial) data     0.16* (0.19) 
0.19** 
(0.14) 
0.18** 
(0.13) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.10* 
(0.23) 
0.13* 
(0.22) 
0.11* 
(0.24) 
0.15** 
(0.14) 
0.17* 
(0.18) 
0.19** 
(0.13) 
0.19** 
(0.12) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Qualitative & quantitative data     0.17* (0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.13) 
0.17* 
(0.10) 
0.23** 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.18) 
0.12* 
(0.15) 
0.15* 
(0.14) 
0.17* 
(0.11) 
0.18* 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.12) 
0.18* 
(0.09) 
0.24** 
(0.02) 
Integration      0.00 (0.05) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.01* 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.17) 
0.00 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.27) 
0.01* 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.01* 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.02* 
(0.05) 
Integration (timetable)     0.01 (0.03) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.03* 
(0.03) 
Integration (restructuring plans)     0.01 (0.29) 
0.02** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.35) 
0.01* 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.28) 
0.01** 
(0.04) 
0.01* 
(0.05) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
      Synergy     0.00 (0.43) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02** 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.51) 
0.00 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.01* 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Investment     0.02 (0.42) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
0.06* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
0.03 
(0.28) 
0.00 
(0.48) 
0.05* 
(0.10)     
Retention     0.04 (0.31) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.24) 
0.13 
(0.42) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.30) 
0.10 
(0.48)     
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†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.005; p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects 
 Control Variables                 
Market-related variables                 
Market volatility         0.01† (0.15) 
0.09* 
(0.07) 
0.02* 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.02) 
0.01* 
(0.10) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.12** 
(0.02) 
Share price shock         0.02† (0.05) 
0.04** 
(0.03) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.12** 
(0.00) 
0.03† 
(0.06) 
0.05** 
(0.05) 
0.04* 
(0.03) 
0.17** 
(0.00) 
Time-related variables                 
After 2008         0.01 (0.33) 
0.09* 
(0.16) 
0.11* 
(0.08) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
0.09* 
(0.15) 
0.1149* 
(0.0714) 
0.13** 
(0.04) 
Time (continuous)         0.08 (0.68) 
0.10† 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.56) 
0.13* 
(0.06)     
Deal type                 
Recommended         0.01 (0.24) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(0.20)     
Contested, Hostile         -0.31* (-0.28) 
-0.32* 
(-0.19) 
-0.29* 
(-0.12) 
-0.36* 
(-0.30) 
-0.28* 
(-0.19) 
-0.31* 
(-0.18) 
-0.27* 
(-0.16) 
-0.39* 
(-0.23) 
Industry relatedness                 
Related         0.08* (0.15) 
0.11** 
(0.06) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.12** 
(0.03) 
0.08* 
(0.14) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.10* 
(0.04) 
0.13** 
(0.09) 
Unrelated         -0.07** (-0.05) 
-0.11 
(-0.07) 
-0.14** 
(-0.03) 
-0.15** 
(-0.02) 
-0.07** 
(-0.04) 
-0.12 
(-0.07) 
-0.13** 
(-0.04) 
-0.16** 
(-0.02) 
Nationality                 
Domestic acquirer         0.01* (0.33) 
0.02* 
(0.16) 
0.01* 
(0.19) 
0.02* 
(0.10) 
0.01* 
(0.34) 
0.02* 
(0.15) 
0.01* 
(0.18) 
0.02* 
(0.09) 
Cross border acquirer         -0.01** (-0.33) 
-0.05** 
(-0.30) 
-0.05** 
(-0.21) 
-0.09** 
(-0.19) 
-0.02** 
(-0.32) 
-0.07** 
(-0.22) 
-0.06** 
(-0.18) 
-0.09** 
(-0.19) 
Type of financing                 
Stock         0.17* (0.10) 
-0.03* 
(-0.21) 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
-0.06* 
(-0.28) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.04* 
(-0.20) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.08* 
(-0.21) 
No stock         0.17* (0.19) 
-0.01* 
(-0.02) 
0.26* 
(0.09) 
-0.01* 
(-0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.19) 
-0.01* 
(-0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.01* 
(-0.03) 
Complexity of the deal                 
Simple         0.01 (0.02) 
0.05 
(0.0) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.11)     
Complex         0.10† (0.01) 
0.12* 
(0.00) 
0.11* 
(0.08) 
0.13** 
(0.04) 
0.11† 
(0.09) 
0.13** 
(0.00) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.15** 
(0.03) 
Size                 
Relative size of bidder vs. target 
(small to large)         
0.09* 
(0.13) 
0.00 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.10 
(0.18)     
Relative size of bidder vs. deal 
(same as above)         
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.13*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.28*** 
(0.01) 
0.02† 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.00) 
0.01† 
(0.04) 
0.31*** 
(0.01) 
Reputation-related                 
Serial M&A         0.00 (0.31) 
0.02**** 
(0.41) 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.05**** 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.02**** 
(0.3141) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.06**** 
(0.11) 
On FG 100 most admired list         0.02 (0.52) 
0.06 
(0.30) 
0.08 
(0.31) 
0.08 
(0.18)     
R-sq. 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.34 
Adj. R-sq. 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.33 
RMSE 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.14 
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